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A NEW EFFICIENT ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED
ON THE INTEGER FACTORIZATION PROBLEM
M.R.K. ARIFFIN
Abstract. A new asymmetric cryptosystem based on the Integer Factoriza-
tion Problem is proposed. It posses an encryption and decryption speed of
O(n2), thus making it the fastest asymmetric encryption scheme available. It
has a simple mathematical structure. Thus, it would have low computational
requirements and would enable communication devices with low computing
power to deploy secure communication procedures efficiently.
1. Introduction
By textbook convention the discrete log problem (DLP) and the elliptic curve
discrete log problem (ECDLP) has been the source of security for cryptographic
schemes such as the Diffie Hellman key exchange (DHKE) procedure, El-Gamal
cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) respectively [2], [8]. As for
the world renowned RSA cryptosystem, the inability to find the e-th root of the
ciphertext C modulo N from the congruence relation C ≡ M e(mod N) coupled
with the inability to factor N = pq for large primes p and q is its fundamental
source of security [11]. It has been suggested that the ECC is able to produce the
same level of security as the RSA with shorter key length. Thus, ECC should be
the preferred asymmetric cryptosystem when compared to RSA [16]. Hence, the
notion “cryptographic efficiency” is conjured. That is, to produce an asymmetric
cryptographic scheme that could produce security equivalent to a certain key length
of the traditional RSA but utilizing shorter keys. However, in certain situations
where a large block needs to be encrypted, RSA is the better option than ECC
because ECC would need more computational effort to undergo such a task [13].
Thus, adding another characteristic toward the notion of “cryptographic efficiency”
which is it must be less “computational intensive” and be able to transmit large
blocks of data (when needed). In 1998 the cryptographic scheme known as NTRU
was proposed with better ”cryptographic efficiency” relative to RSA and ECC [5]
[6] [7]. NTRU has a complexity order of O(n2) for both encryption and decryption
as compared to DHKE, EL-Gammal, RSA and ECC (all have a complexity order
of O(n3)). As such, in order to design a state-of-the-art public key mechanism, the
following are characteristics that must be “ideally” achieved (apart from other well
known security issues):
(1) Shorter key length. If possible shorter than ECC 160-bits.
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(2) Speed. To have speed of complexity order O(n2) for both encryption and
decryption.
(3) Able to increase data set to be transmitted asymmetrically. That is, not to
be restricted in size because of the mathematical structure.
(4) Simple mathematical structure for easy implementation.
In this paper, we produce a newly designed asymmetric cryptosystem based on
the Integer Factorization Problem. The scheme does not require “expensive” opera-
tions. It only requires multiplication and addition for encryption and for decryption
it only utilizes multiplication together with a one time modular reduction.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we define the Diophantine
Equation Hard Problem (DEHP) which is the source of “mathematical hardness”
integrated within the ciphertext equation. The new asymmetric cryptosystem will
be detailed in Section 3. In Section 4, the authors detail the decryption process and
provide a proof of correctness. An example will also be presented. Continuing in
Section 5, we will discuss algebraic attacks. An analysis of lattice based attack will
be given in Section 6. Section 7 will be about the underlying security principles of
the AAβ scheme. A table of comparison between the AAβ scheme against RSA,ECC
and NTRU is given in Section 8. Finally, we shall conclude in Section 9.
2. The Diophantine Equation Hard Problem (DEHP)
In this section we begin by producing a diophantine equation of the form
C = Ax+By
where (A,B,C) are known integers while (x, y) are unknown integers. Another
condition is that gcd(A,B) = 1. We will observe the following 2 cases:
2.1. Case 1. Let the public parameters (A,B) be of length n-bits and the secret
parameters (x, y) also be of length n-bits.
The general solution for (x, y) is given by
• x = x0 +Bt
• y = y0 −At
Since the size if the unknown parameters (x, y) are n-bits, from the following in-
equality
2n−1 − x0
B
< t <
2n − 1− x0
B
and by the fact that 2n−1 < B < 2n− 1, the interval that the variable t belongs to
is approximately given by
2n
B
>
2n
2n − 1
≈ 1
As a result an attacker could be able to determine the value of t and solve for the
unknown pair (x, y) in polynomial time.
2.2. Case 2. Let the public parameters (A,B) be of length n-bits and the secret
parameters (x, y) be of length 2n-bits. The general solution for (x, y) is given by
• x = x0 +Bt
• y = y0 −At
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Since the size if the unknown parameters (x, y) are 2n-bits, from the following
inequality
22n−1 − x0
B
< t <
22n − 1− x0
B
and by the fact that 2n−1 < B < 2n− 1, the interval that the variable t belongs to
is approximately given by
22n
B
>
22n
2n − 1
≈ 2n
As a result an attacker could not be able to determine the value of t and solve for
the unknown pair (x, y) in polynomial time for sufficiently large n.
2.3. Definition (DEHP). The Diophantine Equation Hard Problem (DEHP) is
the problem to determine the preferred solution set (x, y) from C = Ax+By where
(A,B,C) in known and (x, y) is unknown. A correct implementation of DEHP will
be executed as describe in Case 2 above. If the preferred solution set is obtained
then the equation C is said to be prf -solved.
3. A new asymmetric algorithm based on Integer Factorization
Problem
Let us begin by stating that the communication process is between A (Along)
and B (Busu), where Busu is sending information to Along after encrypting the
plaintext with Along’s public key.
• Key Generation by Along
INPUT: Generate a pair of random n-bit prime numbers p and q, an n-bit odd
integer k1, k2 =
q−k1
2
and a random 2n-bit integer u. Another condition is that
p > 2n−1 + 2n−2.
OUTPUT: The public key e1 and e2 where
• e1 = u+ p(k1 + k2)
• e2 = u− pk2
and the private key pair (p, d) where d ≡ v−1(mod p) and v ≡ u(mod p).
• Encryption by Busu
INPUT: The public key (e1, e2) and the message M where M is an n-bit in-
teger within the interval (2n−1, 2n − 1) and M < 2n−1 + 2n−2. As a result M < p.
Compute a random 3n-bit integer X and compute Y = X −M .
OUTPUT: The ciphertext C = Xe1 − Y e2.
• Decryption by Along
INPUT: The private key pair (p, d) and the ciphertext C.
OUTPUT: The plaintext M .
4. Decryption
Proposition 4.1. Cd ≡ M(mod p).
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We now proceed to give a proof of correctness.
Proof. Cd ≡ X−Y ≡ M(mod p). Observe that, modular reduction does not occur
since M < p. 
4.1. Example. Let n = 16. Along will choose the primes p = 65287 and q = 40829.
Then Along chooses the following private parameters:
(1) k1 = 46381
(2) k2 = −2776
(3) u = 3096817651
(4) d = 49913
The public keys will be
(1) e1 = 5943657286
(2) e2 = 3278054363
Busu’s message will be M = 43963 with the following accompanying parameters
(1) X = 281474976710656
(2) Y = 281474976666693
The ciphertext will be C = 750300520815394662808057. To decrypt is arbitrary. 
5. Algebraic Attacks
5.1. Computing with X. To find X = X0+e2j, we should find an integer j such
that 23n−1 < X < 23n − 1. This gives
23n−1 −X0
e2
< j <
23n − 1−X0
e2
.
We know that 22n−1 < e2 < 2
2n − 1. Then the difference between the upper and
the lower bound is
23n − 1−X0
e2
−
23n−1 −X0
e2
≈
23n
e2
>
23n
22n − 1
≈ 2n.
Hence the difference is very large and finding the correct j is infeasible.
Remark 5.1. If one attempts to compute with Y the above scenario when computing
with X would appear.
5.2. Euclidean division attack. From C = Xe1 − Y e2, the size of each public
parameter within C ensures that Euclidean division attacks does not occur. This
can be easily deduced as follows:
(1) ⌊ C
e1
⌋ 6= X
(2) ⌊ C
e2
⌋ 6= Y
A NEW EFFICIENT ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON THE INTEGER FACTORIZATION PROBLEM5
6. Analysis on lattice based attack
With reference to the AAβ scheme in [1] which has gone through square lattice
attack, the ciphertext equation in this article is of the same structure. Recall that
the the structure of the ciphertext AAβ scheme is as follows:
C = UeA1 + V
2eA2
where both (U, V 2) are of size 4n-bits, while both (eA1, eA2) are of size 3n-bits.
That is, the unknown parameters are larger by n-bits from the known parameters.
It is by this fact that the square lattice attack as described in [1] failed upon the
AAβ scheme.
Now, observe that the ciphertext in this article also has its unknown parameters
to be larger by n-bits than the known parameters. It is arbitrary to replicate the
empirical evidence by executing the LLL algorithm upon the scheme in this article
to see that the square lattice attack will not succeed.
7. Underlying security principles
7.1. The public key Integer Factorization Problem. Observe that one can
obtain e1 − e2 = pq. This is obviously the Integer Factorization Problem.
7.2. The ciphertext DEHP. To find the preferred solution set (X,Y ) such that
C = Xe1 − Y e2.
8. Table of Comparison
The following is a table of comparison between RSA, ECC, NTRU and the
scheme in this article. Let |E| denote public key size.
Algorithm Encryption Decryption Ratio Ratio
Speed Speed M : C M : |E|
RSA O(n3) O(n3) 1 : 1 1 : 2
ECC O(n3) O(n3) 1 : 2 1 : 2
NTRU O(n2) O(n2) Varies [5] N/A
Scheme in this paper O(n2) O(n2) 1 : 5 1 : 4
Table 1. Comparison table for input block of length n
9. Conclusion
The asymmetric scheme presented in this paper provides a secure avenue for
implementors who need encryption and decryption speed of complexity orderO(n2).
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